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The Vital Role of the WTO Appellate Body in 
the Promotion of Rule of Law and International 
Cooperation: A Case Study 
By Padideh Ala’i† 
President Trump’s 2018 Trade Policy Agenda (“2018 Trade Agenda”) 
proclaims that “[t]he United States will not allow the WTO—or any other 
multilateral organization—to prevent us from taking actions that are essential to 
the economic well-being of the American people.”1 As part of this agenda, the 
United States has targeted the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) in particular.2 The United States claims that the Appellate Body has 
disregarded the rules as set by WTO Members and has adopted a “non-text based 
interpretation”3 of WTO provisions through an “activist approach.”4 The 2018 
Trade Agenda concludes, “[t]he United States has grown increasingly concerned 
with the activist approach of the Appellate Body on procedural issues, 
interpretative approach, and substantive interpretations.”5 
The United States’ position is based on Article IX.2 of the Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (“Marrakesh 
Agreement”) and Article 3.2 of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding 
(“DSU”). Article IX.2 of the Marrakesh Agreement reserves to “[t]he Ministerial 
†  Professor of Law and Director of International & Comparative Legal Studies (ICLS), 
American University, Washington College of Law. The author wishes to thank her research assistants for 
help with this essay. They are Katayoon Beshkardana, Natalie Zink, and Dimitar Georgiev. 
1. OFF. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2018 TRADE POLICY AGENDA AND 2017 ANNUAL
REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES ON THE TRADE AGREEMENTS PROGRAM 2 (2018) 
[hereinafter 2018 TRADE POLICY AGENDA], https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/Press/Reports/
2018/AR/2018 Annual Report FINAL.PDF. 
2. Id. at 22 (“The most significant area of concern has been panels and the Appellate Body
adding to or diminishing rights and obligations under the WTO Agreement.”); see also id. at 22-28. 
3. Id. at 24 (“In a number of disputes, the United States has expressed concerns that the
Appellate Body’s non-text-based interpretation of Article XIX of the GATT 1994 and the Safeguards 
Agreement has seriously undermined the ability of Members to use safeguards measures. The Appellate 
Body has disrespected the agreed WTO text and read text into the Agreement, applying standards of its 
own devising.”). 
4. Id. at 28.
5. Id.
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Conference and the General Council . . . the exclusive authority to adopt 
interpretations of this Agreement and of the Multilateral Trade Agreements.”6 
Additionally, Article 3.2 of the DSU states that the rulings of the dispute 
settlement body (“DSB”) “cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations 
provided in the covered agreements.”7 
On the other hand, Article 3.2 of the DSU also provides: 
The dispute settlement system of the WTO is a central element in providing security 
and predictability to the multilateral trading system. The Members recognize that it 
serves to preserve the rights and obligations of Members under the covered 
agreements, and to clarify the existing provisions of those agreements in accordance 
with customary rules of interpretation of public international law . . . .8
As a result of the text of the WTO Charter discussed above and Article 3.2 
of the DSU, the dispute settlement panels and Appellate Body have the difficult, 
if not impossible, task of (1) “clarifying” but not “adopting” interpretations of 
the WTO Agreements; and (2) “preserving” but not adding or diminishing rights 
and obligations under the WTO Agreements. Needless to say, it is very difficult 
to clearly distinguish between a clarification and an interpretation. At times, 
“judicial activism” results from the Appellate Body’s attempt to clarify 
provisions of the WTO Agreements through the application of the customary 
rules of interpretation set forth in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
(VCLT).9 
The United States’ criticism of the Appellate Body predates the Trump 
administration.10 It is not alone in this regard—numerous other countries have 
also been critical of the dispute settlement system.11 Given the United States’ 
role as one of the architects of the dispute settlement system, however, its 
opposition has been particularly devastating. Specifically, the United States has 
6. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization art. IX.2, Apr. 15, 1994,
1867 U.N.T.S. 154 [hereinafter Marrakesh Agreement]. The Ministerial Conference and the General 
Council are composed of representatives of WTO Members. See Marrakesh Agreement art. IV.1-2. 
7. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes art. 3.2, Apr.
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401 
[hereinafter DSU]. 
8. Id. art. 3.2 (emphasis added).
9. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter
VCLT]. 
10. See, e.g., 2015 Executive Branch Strategy Regarding WTO Dispute Settlement Panels and
the Appellate Body –Report to the Congress Transmitted by the Secretary of Commerce at 2, cited in 2018 
TRADE POLICY AGENDA, supra note 1, at 23; Statement by the United States at the Meeting of the WTO 
Dispute Settlement Body, Geneva, May 23, 2016 [hereinafter 2016 U.S. DSU Statement], 
https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news16_e/us_statment_dsbmay16_e.pdf. 
11. Other countries, such as Argentina, Australia, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Japan,
Mexico, Norway and Turkey, have also expressed concerns about the Appellate Body’s approach and 
delay in resolution of disputes. See, e.g., World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement Body, Minutes of 
Meeting Held in the Centre William Rappard on July 15, 2011, §§ 12-13, WTO Doc. WT/DSB/M/299; 
World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement Body, Minutes of Meeting Held in the Centre William 
Rappard on July 28, 2011, §§ 12-15, WTO Doc. WT/DSB/M/301; World Trade Organization Dispute 
Settlement Body, Minutes of Meeting Held on October 5, 2011, §§ 11, 15-20, WTO Doc. 
WT/DSB/M/304; World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement Body, Minutes of Meeting Held in the 
Centre William Rappard on June 13, 2012, §§ 23, 30, WTO Doc. WT/DSB/M/317; World Trade 
Organization Dispute Settlement Body, Minutes of Meeting Held in the Centre William Rappard on June 
19, 2015, §§ 7.16-.17, WTO Doc. WT/DSB/M/364. 
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blocked the appointment of new Appellate Body members to replace those 
whose terms have expired.12 As a result, the Appellate Body currently operates 
with only three of the seven members required under the DSU.13 Should any one 
of the Appellate Body members be conflicted in a particular case, the Appellate 
Body will cease to function, since a minimum of three members are required to 
hear any dispute.14 To compound the problem, the terms of two of the three 
remaining members will expire December 2019.15 Inasmuch as the DSU gives 
Member States the “right to appeal,” a non-functioning Appellate Body will 
threaten the dispute settlement mechanism of the WTO as a whole, including its 
panel process. 
Notwithstanding the abovementioned criticism and blocking of new 
appointments to the Appellate Body, the United States continues to participate 
in the WTO dispute settlement process.16 In fact, the 2018 Trade Agenda 
expressly acknowledges the importance of dispute settlement in international 
trade agreements. For example, the 2018 Trade Agenda states that “when the 
WTO dispute settlement system functions according to the rules as agreed by the 
United States and other WTO Members, it provides a vital tool to enforce WTO 
rights and uphold a rule based trading system.”17 The United States also laments 
12. For the recent U.S. decision to block future appointment of Appellate Body members, see
2016 U.S. DSU Statement, supra note 10; Jan Dahinten, U.S. Blocks WTO Judge Reappointment Amid 
Looming Trade Crisis, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 27, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-
08-27/u-s-blocks-wto-judge-reappointment-amid-looming-trade-crisis; Tom Miles, U.S. Blocks WTO
Judge Reappointment as Dispute Settlement Crisis Looms, REUTERS (Aug. 27, 2018),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trade-wto/us-blocks-wto-judge-reappointment-as-his-term-nears-
an-end-idUSKCN1LC19O. The United States is particularly concerned with the Appellate Body practice
that allows its members to continue serving until the cases they have been assigned are finished, even if
the actual term of the member has expired, based on Rule 15 of the Appellate Body Working Procedures.
The 2018 Trade Policy Agenda specifically states that “[t]he United States is resolute in its view that
Members need to resolve [the Rule 15] issue before moving on to the issue of replacing former Appellate
Body members.” 2018 TRADE POLICY AGENDA, supra note 1, at 25-26.
13. The current members of the Appellate Body are Ujal Singh Bhatia of India and Thomas R.
Graham of the United States, whose terms of office will finish on December 10, 2019, and Hong Zhao of 
China, whose term of office will finish on November 30, 2020. See Appellate Body Members, WORLD 
TRADE ORG., https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/ab_members_descrp_e.htm (last visited Feb. 
11, 2019). The WTO’s founding agreements provide that “[the Appellate Body] shall be composed of 
seven persons, three of whom shall serve on any one case . . . .” DSU, supra note 7, art. 17.1. 
14. DSU, supra note 7, art. 17.1.
15. The terms of office of Ujal Singh Bhatia and Thomas R. Graham will expire on December
10, 2019. See Appellate Body Members, supra note 13. 
16. The United States currently has 123 cases at the WTO as a complainant. See Disputes by
Members, WORLD TRADE ORG., https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_by_country_e.htm 
(last visited Jan. 27, 2019). Those cases include U.S. attempts to use the WTO Dispute Resolution System 
against Members who have imposed retaliatory tariffs in response to the United States’ use of the national 
security exception to impose tariffs on steel and aluminum imports. See, e.g., Request for the 
Establishment of a Panel by the United States, Canada – Additional Duties on Certain Products from the 
United States, WTO Doc. WT/DS557/2 (Oct. 19, 2018); Request for the Establishment of a Panel by the 
United States, China – Additional Duties on Certain Products from the United States, WTO Doc. 
WT/DS558/2 (Oct. 19, 2018); Request for the Establishment of a Panel by the United States, Mexico – 
Additional Duties on Certain Products from the United States, WTO Doc. WT/DS560/2 (Oct. 19, 2018). 
The United States has also not shied away from using the WTO dispute system to seek resolution on 
contentious issues. See Constitution of the Panel Established at the Request of the United States: Note by 
the Secretariat, China – Certain Measures Concerning the Protection of Intellectual Property Rights, 
WTO Doc. WT/DS542/9 (Jan. 17, 2019). 
17. 2018 TRADE POLICY AGENDA, supra note 1, at 22 (emphasis added). 
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the fact that NAFTA’s labor and environmental side agreements have an 
“essentially toothless dispute settlement mechanism.”18 These words, however, 
are not very significant when the actions of the United States are inflicting 
irreparable harm to the future of the dispute settlement mechanism and a rule-
based system of international trade—in favor of a purely power-based system 
that allows large countries and important markets to bully others unilaterally. 
If U.S. policy ultimately leads to a non-functioning WTO dispute 
settlement system and de facto elimination of the Appellate Body, the result will 
be a great setback for the advancement of international law and the rule-based 
trading system that promotes peaceful co-existence between nations. To 
illustrate the Appellate Body’s importance to the peaceful balancing of interests 
between nations, this Essay looks at one important trade dispute from the early 
years of the Appellate Body: United States – Import Prohibition of Certain 
Shrimp and Shrimp Products (“U.S.-Shrimp”).19 This case exemplifies the 
important role that the Appellate Body has played in the promotion of 
international law. It does so through an application of the customary international 
law principles on treaty interpretation that takes into account “context” as well 
as “object and purpose” of a treaty.20 
In U.S.-Shrimp, the Appellate Body acknowledged that its activism can 
largely be attributed to the failure of Member States and the WTO’s Committee 
on Trade & Environment (“CTE”) to issue guidance on the inevitable policy 
tensions between trading rules and conservation goals. U.S.-Shrimp is an 
example of the Appellate Body being compelled to address issues before it by 
relying on customary rules of interpretation of public international law.21 
I. THE PANEL DECISION IN U.S.-SHRIMP 
In U.S.-Shrimp, Malaysia, India, Pakistan, and Thailand brought an action 
against the United States at the WTO, arguing that Section 609 of the 
Endangered Species Act (ESA) (“Section 609”) and its implementing 
regulations were inconsistent with Article XI.1 of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT).22 Section 609(b) banned imports of shrimp and 
shrimp products into the United States as a method of limiting the incidental 
killing of sea turtles.23 Meanwhile, Article XI.1 broadly forbids “prohibitions or 
restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges, whether made effective 
 
 18. Id. at 7. 
 19. Appellate Body Report, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp 
Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS58/AB/R (adopted Oct. 12, 1998) [hereinafter U.S.-Shrimp]. 
 20. See id. ¶¶ 155, 158 (citing the VCLT, supra note 9, arts. 31-32) 
 21. It has been the U.S. position that the Appellate Body should just abstain from deciding issues 
in cases when there is not enough guidance from the Members. Amb. Michael Punke, Remarks to the 
students from American University, Washington College of Law (WCL), in Geneva, Switzerland (July 
14, 2016). 
 22. Panel Report, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, 
WTO Doc. WT/DS58/R, at 7 (adopted May 15, 1998) [hereinafter U.S.-Shrimp Panel Report]. 
 23. Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies 
Appropriations Act, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-162, § 609(b), 103 Stat. 988, 1037 (1989) (codified at 16 
U.S.C. § 1537 (2012)). 
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through quotas, import or export licenses, or other measures . . . on the 
importation of any product . . . or on the exportation or sale for export of any 
product.”24 The United States responded to the complainants by asserting that 
Section 609 was part of a conservation measure designed to preserve and protect 
endangered species, and that it was therefore justified as an exception under 
subparagraph (g) of General Exceptions (Article XX) of GATT 1994.25 Sub-
paragraph (g) specifically provides an exception for measures “relating to the 
conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made 
effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or 
consumption,” so long as the measure is not applied in a discriminatory manner 
that is unjustifiable or arbitrary, or is a disguised restriction on trade.26 
Section 609(b), which banned imports of shrimp and shrimp products, 
provided an exemption for imports from “certified” countries.27 The State 
Department’s written guidelines issued pursuant to Section 609 permitted 
countries to obtain certification in two ways: first, if they had a “fishing 
environment [that] . . . does not pose a threat of the incidental taking of sea turtles 
in the course of shrimp harvesting”;28 or second, if they provided 
documentary evidence of the adoption of a regulatory program governing the 
incidental taking of such sea turtles in the course of [shrimp trawling] that is 
comparable to the United States program; and [where] the average rate of that 
incidental taking [of sea turtles] by their vessels of the harvesting nation is 
comparable to the average rate of incidental taking of sea turtles by United States 
vessels . . . .29 
In applying Section 609, the State Department initially issued guidelines 
that limited the scope of the import ban to the Caribbean/Western Atlantic 
region.30 This geographical limitation prompted negotiations between the United 
States and Caribbean and Western Atlantic countries, which ultimately resulted 
in the “Inter-American Convention for the Protection and Conservation of Sea 
Turtles” (“Inter-American Convention”).31 Unfortunately, one month prior to the 
effective date of the import ban, the United States Court of International Trade 
(CIT) ruled that the State Department guidelines were wrong, and thus, the ban 
became applicable worldwide.32 This CIT ruling led to disparate treatment 
because the complainants were not included in the Inter-American Convention, 
 
 24. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 art. XI.1, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 187, 33 I.L.M. 1153 
(1994) [hereafter GATT 1994]. 
 25. U.S.-Shrimp Panel Report, supra note 22, ¶ 3.3. See generally GATT 1994, supra note 24, 
art. XX. 
 26. Id. art. XX(g). 
 27. § 609(b). 
 28. Pub. L. No. 101-162, § 609(b)(2)(C), 103 Stat. 988, 1038 (1989). 
 29. § 609(b)(2)(A), (B) (emphasis added). 
 30. The 1991 Guidelines specifically mention Mexico, Belize, Guatemala, Honduras, 
Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama, Colombia, Venezuela, Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana, Suriname, French 
Guyana, and Brazil, 56 Fed. Reg. 1051 (Jan. 10, 1991). 
 31. U.S.-Shrimp, supra note 19, ¶ 167; Inter-American Convention for the Protection and 
Conservation of Sea Turtles, Dec. 1, 1996, T.I.A.S. No. 01-502, 2164 U.N.T.S. 29 (entered into force May 
2, 2001). 
 32. See Earth Island Institute v. Christopher, 913 F. Supp. 559, 572 (Ct. Int’l Trade 1995). 
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and were thus treated differently than the Convention’s non-U.S. signatories. 
The DSB panel in U.S.-Shrimp held that Section 609 failed the chapeau of 
Article XX.33 The chapeau states that exceptions under Article XX must not be 
applied “in a manner that would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a 
disguised restriction on international trade.”34 The panel applied the multilateral 
trading system test to interpret this chapeau language and held that, 
if an interpretation of the chapeau of Article XX were to be followed which would 
allow a Member to adopt measures conditioning access to its market for a given 
product upon the adoption by the exporting Members of certain policies, including 
conservation policies, GATT 1994 and the WTO Agreement could no longer serve 
as a multilateral framework for trade among Members as security and predictability 
of trade relations under those agreements would be threatened.35 
As a result, the panel never analyzed Section 609 under subparagraph (g) 
of Article XX. This is because the panel saw Section 609 as a type of unilateral 
measure intended to pressure other countries into adopting the same conservation 
policies as the United States. The panel reasoned that the coercive approach of 
Section 609, if adopted by other Members of the WTO, would undermine the 
multilateral trading system and could therefore never be justified under Article 
XX. 
II. THE APPELLATE BODY IN U.S.-SHRIMP: REASONING AND IMPACT 
On appeal, the Appellate Body adopted a long-term perspective and 
corrected the panel’s analysis in significant ways. It ultimately affirmed, 
however, that Section 609 was inconsistent with the United States’ WTO 
obligations. First, the Appellate Body reversed the panel’s holding that Section 
609 was a type of unilateral measure that could never be justified under Article 
XX subparagraph (g). It actually argued instead that Section 609 was precisely 
the type of measure for which Article XX subparagraph (g) was intended. The 
Appellate Body admonished the panel for beginning its analysis with the chapeau 
of Article XX rather than subparagraph (g), in contravention of the direction 
given by previous Appellate Body decisions.36 The Appellate Body then applied 
the rules of interpretation set forth in the VCLT to interpret the “context” of 
subparagraph (g) in light of the preamble of the Marrakesh Agreement.37 
In applying the VCLT, the Appellate Body introduced flexibility into the 
words of Article XX(g), even though the words had remained unchanged since 
they were originally drafted after World War II and incorporated into GATT 
1947. While acknowledging that the words “exhaustible natural resource” were 
 
 33. U.S.-Shrimp Panel Report, supra note 22, ¶¶ 7.44-7.62. 
 34. GATT 1994, supra note 24, art. XX. 
 35. U.S.-Shrimp Panel Report, supra note 22, ¶ 7.45 (emphasis added). 
 36. See U.S.-Shrimp, supra note 19, at ¶¶ 118-19 (“The analysis is . . . two-tiered: first, 
provisional justification by reason of characterization of the measure under XX(g); second, further 
appraisal of the same measure under the introductory clauses of Article XX.”) (citing Appellate Body 
Report, United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline 22, WTO Doc. 
WT/DS2/AB/R (adopted Apr. 29, 1996)). 
 37. See id. ¶¶ 125-45. 
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drafted “more than 50 years ago,” the Appellate Body insisted that the phrase 
“must be read by a treaty interpreter in light of contemporary concerns of the 
community of nations about the protection and preservation of the 
environment.”38 Indeed, the Appellate Body noted, “[t]he International Court of 
Justice stated that where concepts embodied in a treaty are ‘by definition, 
evolutionary’, their ‘interpretation cannot remain unaffected by the subsequent 
development of law . . . .’” 39 Thus, although the language of Article XX has not 
changed, it must be read in light of the new preamble of the Marrakesh 
Agreement, which recognizes that the expansion of the production of trade in 
goods and services should “allow[] for the optimal use of the world’s resources 
in accordance with the objective of sustainable development, seeking to both 
protect and preserve the environment and to enhance the means for doing so in 
a manner consistent with [the Parties’] respective needs and concerns at different 
levels of economic development.”40 
Importantly, the Appellate Body used the language of the preamble of the 
WTO Charter to infuse meaning into the words of both the subparagraph and the 
chapeau of Article XX. The Appellate Body also drew on international 
conventions and declarations relating to environmental conservation, such as the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, the Convention on Biological 
Diversity, the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development’s 
Agenda 21, the Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild 
Animals, and the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of 
Wild Fauna and Flora.41 By relying on the preamble, the Appellate Body 
departed from past interpretations of Article XX subparagraph (g). Contrary to 
the panel’s analysis, it concluded that Section 609 fulfilled the requirements of 
Article XX subparagraph (g), as it was “primarily aimed at” preserving an 
exhaustible natural resource and rendering effective domestic restrictions on 
production and consumption.42 
In interpreting the text of the chapeau, the Appellate Body explicitly cited 
Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT and remarked, “our task here is to interpret the 
chapeau, seeking additional interpretative guidance, as appropriate, from the 
general principles of international law.”43 Applying its interpretation, it 
ultimately agreed with the panel that Section 609 failed the requirements of the 
article’s chapeau, but only because of the way the United States had applied the 
measure—not, as the panel had determined, because it undermined the 
multilateral trading system and thus could not be justified under Article XX.44 
38. Id. ¶ 129.
39. Id. ¶ 130 (citing Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa
in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory 
Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 16 (June 21)). 
40. Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 6, pmbl.
41. See U.S. Shrimp, supra note 19, ¶¶ 130, 132.
42. Id. ¶ 160 (“[A]lthough the [U.S.] measure itself falls within the terms of Article XX(g),
nevertheless [it] constitutes ‘a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where 
the same conditions prevail’ or ‘a disguised restriction on international trade.’”). 
43. Id. ¶ 158 (citing VCLT, supra note 9, art. 31(3)(c)).
44. Id. ¶ 186 (summarizing conclusion that although the United States was pursuing a legitimate
objective, it violated the non-discrimination principle). 
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Once again, in discussing the chapeau, the Appellate Body referred to the 
preamble of the Marrakesh Agreement. It emphasized that the requirements of 
Article XX’s chapeau must be read in conjunction with—and in light of—the 
preamble of the Marrakesh Agreement and its new emphasis on sustainable 
development.45 According to the Appellate Body, “[a]s this new preambular 
language reflects the intentions of the negotiators of the WTO Agreement, we 
believe it must add colour, texture and shading to our interpretations of 
agreements annexed to the WTO Agreement, in this case, the GATT 1994.”46 
Section 609 failed to meet the requirements of the chapeau of Article XX 
because the United States never even attempted to negotiate an international 
agreement with the complainants. In practice, the United States required 
identical policies from the complainants rather than policies comparable in 
effectiveness, as mandated by the words of Section 609. Further, the certification 
process it mandated was singularly informal and casual, which also violated the 
transparency norms of the WTO Agreement.47 The Appellate Body decision in 
U.S.-Shrimp pushed the United States to modify its behavior and start 
negotiations with the complainants for an international agreement. The United 
States revised its certification policies in an effort to increase transparency and 
flexibility, which included the creation of the Shrimp Exporter’s Declaration 
Forms. 
A few years after U.S.-Shrimp, Malaysia brought a compliance action 
before a WTO panel (subsequently appealed to the Appellate Body) claiming 
that the United States had not complied fully with the ruling in U.S.-Shrimp. 
Malaysia argued that the United States had not withdrawn Section 609 nor 
concluded an international agreement on sea turtles with Malaysia.48 In this 
compliance context, the Appellate Body ruled in favor of the United States and 
upheld Section 609 as justified under both subparagraph (g) of Article XX and 
the chapeau.49 
The Appellate Body’s flexible approach to the interpretation and 
application of Article XX allowed it to accommodate U.S. conservation and 
environmental goals while criticizing the United States’ coercive, unilateral 
approach. The Appellate Body mentioned that it was forced to address these 
issues because the Members had themselves failed to confront the tensions 
between environmental/conservation measures and trade regulation.50 The 
Members had recognized the importance of this issue and created the CTE to 
address “any policy contradiction between upholding and safeguarding an open, 
non-discriminatory and equitable multilateral trading system on one hand and 
 
 45. Id. ¶ 152. 
 46. Id. ¶ 153. 
 47. See id. ¶ 182 (“[I]t is only reasonable that rigorous compliance with the fundamental 
requirements of due process should be required in the application and administration of a measure which 
purports to be an exception to the treaty obligations of the Member imposing the measure . . . .”). 
 48. Appellate Body Report, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp 
Products: Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Malaysia, WTO Doc. WT/DS58/AB/RW (adopted Oct. 
22, 2001) [hereinafter U.S.-Shrimp Recourse]. 
 49. U.S.-Shrimp, supra note 19, ¶ 153(b). 
 50. U.S.-Shrimp, supra note 19, ¶ 155. 
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acting for protection of the environment and the promotion of sustainable 
development on the other.”51 However, the Appellate Body argued that the CTE 
provided little guidance to it at the time, forcing the Appellate Body to resort to 
its own interpretative rules via the VCLT.52 Specifically, the Appellate Body 
stated: 
Pending any specific recommendations by the CTE to WTO Members on the issues 
raised in its terms of reference, and in the absence up to now of any agreed 
amendments or modifications to the substantive provisions of the GATT 1994 and 
the WTO Agreement generally, we must fulfill our responsibility in this specific case, 
which is to interpret the existing language of the chapeau of Article XX by examining 
its ordinary meaning, in light of its context and object and purpose in order to 
determine whether the United States measure qualifies for justification under Article 
XX.53
Therefore, whatever “activism” the Appellate Body practiced in this case 
can be attributed to the failure of the CTE and the Members to provide adequate 
guidance and the Appellate Body’s mandate to “clarify” existing provisions “in 
accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public international law.”54 
In sum, the Appellate Body report in U.S.-Shrimp is significant for the 
following reasons. First, it discouraged unilateral action by an economic 
superpower, which has detrimental effects on developing countries. The United 
States not only responded to the complaint but also felt obliged to comply with 
the ruling by modifying the application of a domestic conservation law. Second, 
the decision enhanced the impact and significance of both public international 
law and international environmental law by incorporating the VCLT and 
international environmental agreements and declarations. Third, the Appellate 
Body’s approach encouraged movement towards an international agreement that 
is arguably more effective in conserving endangered sea turtles than unilateral 
action. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellate Body reports, like those of any other judicial and arbitral body, 
are not all uniformly sound and perfectly reasoned. However, the Appellate Body 
achieved its status as the “jewel in the crown”55 of the multilateral trading system 
because of decisions like U.S.-Shrimp, in which it resolved a dispute in a manner 
that facilitated Member compliance and upheld the rule of law. 
U.S.-Shrimp demonstrates how the Appellate Body utilizes the principles
of public international law—such as those set forth in the VCLT—to infuse 
51. Trade and Environment, Ministerial Decision of 14 April 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1267 (1994).
52. Richard G. Tarasofsky, The WTO Committee on Trade and Environment: Is It Making a
Difference?, 3 MAX PLANCK UNITED NATIONS Y.B. 479-80 (1999). 
53. U.S.-Shrimp, supra note 19, ¶ 155.
54. DSU, Dispute Settlement Rules: Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the
Settlement of Disputes, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization Art. 3(2), 
Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401, 33 I.L.M. 1226 (1994). 
55. Press Release, World Trade Org., WTO Disputes Reach 400 Mark (Nov. 6, 2009),
https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres09_e/pr578_e.htm (“‘The dispute settlement system is widely 
considered to be the jewel in the crown of the WTO,’ said [Director-General Pascal] Lamy.”). 
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flexibility into the provisions of WTO agreements. By adopting a flexible 
reading of Article XX, the Appellate Body in U.S.-Shrimp improved the panel 
decision in significant ways. The Appellate Body decision forced the United 
States to modify the application of Section 609 and to engage in negotiations for 
a multilateral solution without abandoning the measure altogether. The U.S. 
response allowed the Appellate Body to eventually determine that Section 609 
was justified under Article XX(g).56 The Appellate Body’s approach, while not 
perfect, permitted the United States to save face and maintain a conservation 
measure through a multilateral approach. 
The disproportionate impact of Appellate Body reports is largely due to 
political stalemate and a non-functioning legislative body at the WTO. The best 
way to avoid “activist judging” is for governments to have successful trade 
negotiations and avoid bringing cases to the WTO dispute settlement system that 
implicate difficult balancing issues or are essentially intractable disputes that 
have not been amenable to diplomatic solutions. Unfortunately, WTO Members 
are doing the opposite by increasingly invoking the heretofore sparingly used 
national security exception in trade disputes.57 
The Appellate Body has worked diligently to balance the competing goals 
of providing flexibility to the multilateral trading system and maintaining its 
security and predictability. Only a standing Appellate Body is capable of taking 
such a long-term view. As illustrated by the preceding discussion of U.S.-Shrimp, 
such decisions have been instrumental in improving global trade relations, and 
we must not “throw out the baby with the bathwater.” The Appellate Body can 
still be the jewel in the crown of the global trading system, and it should be 
allowed to do its job. 
 
 56. See U.S.-Shrimp Recourse, supra note 48. 
 57. At its meeting on November 21, 2018, the DSB agreed to requests from seven Members for 
the establishment of panels to examine tariffs imposed by the United States on steel and aluminum 
imports: China, the European Union, Canada, Mexico, Norway, Russia, and Turkey. The DSB also agreed 
to four U.S. requests for panels to examine countermeasures imposed on U.S. imports by China, Canada, 
the European Union, and Mexico in response to the steel and aluminum tariffs. See Panels Established to 
Review U.S. Steel and Aluminum Tariffs, Countermeasures on U.S. Imports, WORLD TRADE ORG. (Nov. 
21, 2018), https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news18_e/dsb_19nov18_e.htm. 
